

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (State)

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March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense)

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March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

2.

3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

The intelligence plan requires support by U. S. military manpower and equipment.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U. S. military capability for intervention.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

The U. S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)

March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (State) ✓

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Ind. guide

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Make political decision to intervene with U. S. military forces in Cuba.
2. U. S. officials and news releases on policy decision.
3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.

To overtly engage the U. S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U. S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U. S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U. S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.

This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U. S. security interests.

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.

Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.

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**OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (Defense)**

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
1. After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.	To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.	DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.
2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.	To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.	Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (CIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Support U. S. military actions in Cuba.

PURPOSE

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U. S. military operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U. S. military commander of the U. S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (USIA)

ACTIVITY

1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.

PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U. S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U. S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.